The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 34 (2006)

Article 14

R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and Self-Reflection
in the Supreme Court
Gary Trotter

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Trotter, Gary. "R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and Self-Reflection in the Supreme Court." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 34. (2006).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and
Self-Reflection in the
Supreme Court
Mr. Justice Gary Trotter*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s work in 2005 saw few ground-breaking
pronouncements in criminal law. Most of the Court’s decisions involved
the application of settled law, without the application of the Charter.1 A
notable exception was the Court’s decision in R. v. Henry,2 in which the
Court took the opportunity to look back on 20 years of its own
jurisprudence interpreting the protection against self-incrimination in
section 13 of the Charter. In the process, it took the “rare” step of
reconsidering a number of its previous decisions in the area. The result
is a very different right against self-incrimination, one that is unwed to
any single theoretical approach to the right.
More profoundly, the Court in Henry signals a more flexible
approach to the precedential value of obiter dicta remarks in its own
decisions. In the British Columbia Court of Appeal,3 two judges
expressed concern about certain views expressed in obiter dicta by
Arbour J.’s majority reasons in R. v. Noël.4 The Supreme Court in Henry
points in a new direction as to how obiter remarks should be approached
by the lower courts.

*

The Honourable Mr. Justice Gary Trotter is a Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice,
Toronto Region.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. See Ian R. Smith and Gary T. Trotter,
“Developments in Criminal Law: The 2004-2005 Term” (2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 207, at 207.
2
[2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 449.
3
[2003] B.C.J. No. 2068, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (C.A.).
4
[2002] S.C.J. No. 68, 5 C.R. (6th) 1.
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II. PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
SEARCHING FOR A PRINCIPLE
Protection against self-incrimination is found in section 13 of the
Charter, which provides:
13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to
have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that
witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury
or for the giving of contradictory evidence. (emphasis added)

Compared to some sections of the Charter, section 13 is drafted
somewhat awkwardly, particularly in terms of the use of tense. Perhaps
this is unavoidable because the section attempts to regulate the
relationship between two separate events — the impact of testimony
given at one proceeding being used at a subsequent proceeding.
The availability of other legal rights in the Charter is conditioned by
qualifiers such as “everyone”,5 “on arrest or detention”,6 a person
“charged with an offence”.7 Section 13 is unique in that it purports to
provide protection to “a witness”. However, it will be apparent from the
discussion below that the protection is now only afforded to an accused
person who was previously a non-accused witness who was compelled
to testify in other proceedings.8
Section 13 has proven difficult to interpret because of its
relationship with other Charter rights, such as sections 7 (fundamental
justice), 11(c) (the right not to be compelled to be a witness against
oneself) and 11(d) (the presumption of innocence). Moreover, section
13 was created against a rich history of a common law privilege against
self-incrimination, and the statutory response to that privilege in section
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.9 In light of all of these considerations,
it is not surprising that section 13 has presented challenges for the
courts.

5
For example, see s. 7 (fundamental justice), s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure), s. 9
(arbitrary detention) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual treatment or punishment).
6
See s. 10(a), (b), (c).
7
See s. 11(a) to (i).
8
There are various ways that a person may be compelled to participate in a criminal trial.
See Part XXII (Procuring Attendance) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. However, these
formal aspects of testimonial compulsion appear to play no role in this part of the law.
9
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. See David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th
ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), Chapter 8 — Self-Incrimination.
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1. R. v. Dubois
The seminal case on section 13 of the Charter is R. v. Dubois.10
Dubois was charged with second degree murder. At his first trial, he
testified in his own defence. He admitted the actus reus of the offence,
but asserted that he was justified in killing the victim on the basis of
self-defence. Dubois was convicted. He successfully appealed to the
Court of Appeal and a new trial was ordered. At Dubois’ second trial, as
part of its case in chief, the Crown filed approximately 60 pages of the
accused’s testimony from his first trial. Dubois did not testify at his
second trial and was convicted. His appeal to the Alberta Court of
Appeal was dismissed.11
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused’s
appeal. The differences between the majority and minority judgments
reflect two different approaches to section 13. Writing for the majority,
Lamer J. (as he then was) (Dickson C.J., Estey, Chouinard, Wilson and
LeDain JJ., concurring) held that section 13 of the Charter must be
viewed in light of section 11(c) and 11(d) of the Charter. Justice Lamer
held that the protection in section 13, in conjunction with section 11(c)
and 11(d), form the basis of the “case to meet principle” whereby the
burden is placed on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the accused need not be called upon to answer
until a case has been made out against him.12 As Lamer J. held:
Hence, the purpose of s. 13, when the section is viewed in the context
of s. 11(c) and (d), is to protect individuals from being indirectly
compelled to incriminate themselves, to ensure that the Crown will not
be able to do indirectly that which s. 11(c) prohibits. It guarantees the
right not to have a person’s previous testimony used to incriminate
him or her in other proceedings.13

A number of conclusions follow from this conceptualization of
section 13 of the Charter. First, the protection does not arise at the point
in time when the person gives the testimony in question (i.e., at a prior
10

[1985] S.C.J. No. 69, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 513.
[1984] A.J. No. 820, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (C.A.).
12
Supra, note 10, at 531. The “case to meet” principle appears to have stemmed from the
writings of Professor Ed Ratushny. For example, see Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the
Canadian Criminal Process (Toronto: Carswell, 1979). In R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 89
C.C.C. (3d) 289, Lamer C.J. further expanded on the “case to meet” principle in the context of a
Crown request to amend an indictment mid-trial.
13
Id., at 532.
11
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proceeding); instead, it is triggered when an attempt is made to use the
prior testimony to incriminate the witness at a subsequent proceeding.14
Moreover, the Court held that the issue of whether the testimony is
incriminatory should be evaluated at the second stage of the
proceedings, when an attempt is made to use the evidence against an
accused person.15
Second, and importantly for the purposes of this paper, Lamer J.
held that the protection in section 13 of the Charter applies whether or
not the witness testified voluntarily or under compulsion in the previous
proceedings:
Moreover, given the nature and purpose of the right, which is
essentially protection against self-incrimination, the issue of whether
the testimony was compulsory or voluntary at the moment it was given
is largely irrelevant. The focus of the right is on the second
proceedings, the time at which the previous testimony is sought to be
used, rather than the time at which it is given.
For these reasons, s. 13, in my view, applies as much to testimony
voluntarily given by an accused as to testimony given by a witness
under compulsion.16 (emphasis added)

Lack of compulsion in terms of the accused’s prior testimony is
consistent with the “case to meet” approach to the right. As discussed
below, it is not consistent with the competing approach to selfincrimination.
Lastly, the majority in Dubois held that a re-trial on the same
indictment satisfied the requirement of “other proceedings” in section
13 of the Charter. As Lamer J. held:
To allow the prosecution to use, as part of its case, the accused’s
previous testimony would, in effect, allow the Crown to do indirectly
what it is estopped from doing directly by s. 11(c), i.e., to compel the
accused to testify. It would also permit an indirect violation of the
right of the accused to be presumed innocent and remain silent until
proven guilty by the prosecution, as guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the
Charter.17

14

Id., at 534. This was a live issue in the case because Mr. Dubois’ first trial was held
prior to the Charter coming into force, whereas his second trial occurred after.
15
Id., at 536-37.
16
Id., at 534.
17
Id., at 537-38.
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The majority found that Dubois’ rights under section 13 of the Charter
had been violated by the Crown’s use of his testimony at his previous
trial. A new trial was ordered.
In a separate opinion, McIntyre J. dissented. His decision turned on
his conclusion that a re-trial was not an “other proceeding” within the
meaning of section 13 of the Charter. Justice McIntyre approached
section 13 from a very different perspective than the majority and
interpreted the provision by comparing it with the operation of section
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.18 He noted that, in many ways, section
13 of the Charter vindicates the same values protected by section 5(2),
by encouraging truthful testimony from a person in exchange for
protection against subsequent use against the person giving the
testimony.19 As McIntyre J. explained:
There is a social interest in encouraging people to come forward
to give evidence, not only in court but on other occasions in the
tribunals and proceedings referred to above. That interest is not served
where witnesses in testifying expose themselves to the danger of selfincrimination because of such testimony. It is suggested that it was a
recognition of this fact, together with a recognition of the inadequacy
of the law relating to self-incrimination and the inadequacy of
provincial powers in this respect that caused the framers of the Charter
to include the very greatly strengthened Charter provisions relating to
self-incrimination.20

This conception of protection against self-incrimination as a bargain or a
contract has been referred to as the quid pro quo approach.21 Unlike the
“case to meet” approach, this view of self-incrimination assigns
significance to the question of whether the accused testified voluntarily
at the first proceeding. As the theory goes, when the accused person
testifies of his or her own accord, there is nothing to be compensated for
by the state. In essence, there is no bargain to be made because the
accused has sacrificed nothing. This may be gleaned from McIntyre J.’s
view that Dubois’ rights under section 11(c) were not violated when the

18

Id., at 537-38. R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10.
Id., at 521-22.
20
Id., at 526-27.
21
This expression appears to have been coined by Fish J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Noël,
[2001] J.Q. no 2831, 156 C.C.C. (3d) 56 (C.A.), affd [2002] S.C.J. No. 68, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 193,
discussed below.
19
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Crown adduced his prior testimony as part of its case in chief because
Dubois testified voluntarily at his first trial.22
2. R. v. Mannion
Dubois was applied in R. v. Mannion.23 Mannion was charged with rape
and was convicted at the conclusion of his first trial. Mannion testified
at his first trial. A new trial was ordered by the Court of Appeal. At his
second trial, Mannion was cross-examined on a portion of his testimony
from his first trial. Specifically, he was cross-examined on his previous
testimony on the issue of the circumstances under which he left town
before being arrested. Mannion was convicted at his second trial and his
appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.24
Justice McIntyre wrote the unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court. Accepting the majority holding in Dubois that a re-trial on the
same indictment is an “other proceeding” for the purposes of section 13,
McIntyre J. held that the cross-examination of the accused on his
previous testimony was barred by the application of section 13, since the
purpose of the cross-examination was to incriminate the accused. Justice
McIntyre concluded:
It is clear then that the purpose of the cross-examination, which
revealed the inconsistent statements, was to incriminate the
respondent. This evidence was relied upon by the Crown to establish
the guilt of the accused. It is therefore my view that s. 13 of the
Charter clearly applies to exclude the incriminating use of the
evidence of these contradictory statements.25

Justice McIntyre observed that the accused could have received the
same protection had he invoked the protection of section 5(2) of the
22
See supra, note 10, at 527, where McIntyre J. said:
Section 11(c) gives the accused the right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings
against himself in respect of the offence. There is not in this case any compulsion involved.
The appellant gave evidence voluntarily at his trial and on the basis of that evidence
obtained a new trial. I do not accept the suggestion that appears in the judgment of Kerans
J.A. that he was only technically a voluntary witness. He had a fully guaranteed right to
silence. He was represented by counsel and he gave evidence. The provisions of s. 11(c) are
not engaged in these circumstances where no compulsion existed. The Crown is merely
invoking the well-settled rule of evidence that past statements made by a party are
ordinarily receivable in evidence against him …
23
[1986] S.C.J. No. 53, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 544.
24
[1984] A.J. No. 987, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 503 (C.A.).
25
Supra, note 23, at 551.
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Canada Evidence Act. Anxious not to interpret section 13 of the Charter
so as to provide less protection than section 5(2), McIntyre J. held that
section 13 applied.26
3. R. v. Kuldip
In R. v. Kuldip27 the accused was charged with failing to stop at the
scene of an accident, contrary to section 233(2) of the Criminal Code.28
The accused testified at his first trial and was convicted. A new trial was
ordered at which the accused also testified. However, at the second trial,
the accused testified to different details concerning his attempts to report
the accident to the police. The Crown purported to undermine the
accused’s credibility with use of his prior testimony. The Court of
Appeal allowed the accused’s appeal,29 holding that Mannion afforded
no exception based on the intended use of the previous testimony
(incrimination vs. credibility). This was based, in part, on the fact that
the statutory protection provided in section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence
Act30 recognized no such distinction.
Writing for the majority, Lamer C.J. recognized the distinction
between cross-examination intended to incriminate and crossexamination for the purposes of attacking credibility. He concluded:
Using a prior inconsistent statement from a former proceeding during
cross-examination in order to impugn the credibility of an accused
does not, in my view, incriminate that accused person. The previous
statement is not tendered as evidence to establish the proof of its
contents, but rather is tendered for the purpose of unveiling a
contradiction between what the accused is saying now, and what he or
she has said on a previous occasion.31

In making this distinction, Lamer C.J. acknowledged that the distinction
between incrimination and credibility might be a difficult one for a jury
26

Id. Note that in R. v. Kuldip, [1990] S.C.J. No. 126, 1 C.R. (4th) 285, Lamer C.J.
rejected the notion that s. 13 ought to always result in greater protection for the accused person. At
305, he said: “The Charter aims to guarantee that individuals benefit from a minimum standard of
fundamental rights. If Parliament chooses to grant protection over and above that which is
enshrined in our Charter, it is always at liberty to do so.”
27
Id.
28
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
29
[1988] O.J. No. 40, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (C.A.).
30
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
31
Supra, note 26, at 302.
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to make. However, he relied on the ability of trial judges to provide
juries with proper limiting instructions, “reminiscent of those which are
routinely given with respect to the use to which an accused’s criminal
record may be put”.32
In deciding Kuldip, the majority took a very straightforward
approach to section 13 of the Charter and, in the process, seems to have
subtly shifted emphasis in favour of the quid pro quo approach to the
section 13 protection, rather than Lamer C.J.’s preferred “case to meet”
analysis in Dubois. As Lamer C.J. said:
An accused has the right to remain silent during his or her trial.
However, if an accused chooses to take the stand, that accused is
implicitly vouching for his or her credibility. Such an accused, like
any other witness, has therefore opened the door to having the
trustworthiness of his/her evidence challenged. An interpretation of
s. 13 which insulates such an accused from having previous
inconsistent statements put to him/her on cross-examination where the
only purpose of doing so is to challenge that accused’s credibility,
would, in my view, “stack the deck” too highly in favour of the
accused.33

In a judgment simply agreeing with the Court of Appeal, Wilson J. (La
Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. concurring) dissented.
4. R. v. Noël
R. v. Noël34 introduced new variables into the analysis. Noël was a nonaccused witness in a previous proceeding. As the Court’s subsequent
decision in Henry makes clear, this becomes a critical factor. Also,
unlike in the Court’s previous cases dealing with section 13, Noël
invoked the protection of section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act when
he testified in the previous proceeding.
Noël and his brother were alleged to have been involved in the
killing of a nine-year-old boy. For reasons never explained, the accused
and his brother were tried separately. The accused had made a number
of incriminating statements to the police and then testified for the
Crown at his brother’s trial. The Crown was permitted to cross-examine

32
33
34

Id., at 303.
Id., at 303.
Supra, note 4.
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the accused, who eventually admitted that his statements to the police
were true and that he had been an accomplice in killing the young boy.
Noël’s brother was acquitted. At his own trial, Noël disavowed his
previous statements to the police and his earlier testimony at his
brother’s trial. He was cross-examined at great length on his previous
testimony.35 Noël was convicted. His appeal to the Quebec Court of
Appeal was dismissed.36
Writing for the majority, Arbour J. (McLachlin C.J., Gonthier,
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and LeBel JJ.) had no difficulty in
concluding that section 13 of the Charter had been infringed. Invoking
an interpretation closely aligned with the purposes of section 5(2) of the
Canada Evidence Act, Arbour J. held:
Section 13 reflects a long-standing form of statutory protection
against compulsory self-incrimination in Canadian law and is best
understood by reference to s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act. Like the
statutory protection, the constitutional one represents what Fish J.A.
called a quid pro quo: when a witness is compelled to give evidence in
a court proceeding is exposed to the risk of self-incrimination, the state
offers protection against the subsequent use of that evidence against
the witness in exchange for his or her full and frank testimony.37

Further expounding on the quid pro quo, Arbour J. said:
The witness, now accused, gave something in exchange for the
protection. This is what makes a statement given in a judicial
proceeding different from a statement to a person in authority, which
is governed by rules of admissibility that are relevant to the special
concerns related to that type of statement, and also different from all
other out-of-court declarations and admissions.38

Based on this conception of the protection afforded under section 5(2)
of the Canada Evidence Act and section 13 of the Charter, the majority
refused to recognize a distinction between evidence given under
compulsion and evidence given voluntarily. In both circumstances,
Arbour J. held, once a witness takes the stand, he or she is required to
answer all questions asked. As Arbour J. said: “The bargain is engaged
when the jeopardy arises. The protection is given in exchange for the

35
36
37
38

Id., at 16.
[2001] J.Q. No. 2831, 156 C.C.C. (3d) 17 (C.A.).
Supra, note 4, at 25.
Id., at 25.
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answer.”39 However, Arbour J. held that the bargain only extends to uses
of that evidence designed to “incriminate” the accused. As Arbour J.
explained, Kuldip seemed to accept that the bargain did not extend to
protection against the use of prior testimony designed only to challenge
the credibility of the witness. She held that the distinction recognized in
Kuldip fades away when the permitted use of the prior testimony and the
impermissible use become totally intermingled and “when it is apparent
that the prohibited use is of much greater value to the Crown and
probably of irresistible appeal to the jury”.40
The majority in Noël was further concerned with the nature of the
evidence given at the prior proceeding. In Dubois, the Court had
rejected the notion that it was necessary to determine whether or not the
prior testimony was incriminating. However, this became crucial in
Noël because cross-examination on prior testimony that was on its face
incriminating, made the limited use of cross-examination for the
purposes of testing credibility only more implausible to maintain.41
Moreover, the majority pointed out that when the protection of section
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act is requested, as it was by Noël, it
applies to any use in a subsequent proceeding, whether as part of the
Crown’s case in-chief or for the purposes of cross-examination. Justice
Arbour held that the trial judge should have prevented the Crown from
engaging in any cross-examination of Noël based on this statutory
protection alone.42
After engaging in a probing comparative examination of section 13
of the Charter and section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act, Arbour J.
emerged with an important distinction, based on the characterization of
the evidence given in the prior proceeding:
In the result, when the evidence given in a judicial proceeding by
a witness who subsequently becomes an accused was incriminating at
the time it was given, such that the witness could have been granted
the statutory protection of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act, but did not
know to ask, the focus should shift to the use that the Crown proposes
to make of that evidence at the subsequent trial of the accused.
Clearly, as in Dubois, supra, the Crown is precluded from introducing
it as part of its case in chief. Whether the Crown can confront the

39
40
41
42

Id., at 26.
Id., at 27.
Id., at 27. See also R. v. B. (W.D.), [1987] S.J. No. 631, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (C.A.).
Id., at 29.
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accused with his prior incriminating testimony in cross-examination,
purportedly to test credibility, will depend on whether there is a real
danger, despite any warning given to the jury, that the protected
evidence may be used to incriminate the accused. This is so in part
because of the quid pro quo. There should be no risk attached to being
compelled to give incriminating evidence, save to answer to perjury or
similar charges.
If the prior testimony of the accused was innocuous at the time it
was given, it is unlikely that it will serve to incriminate him when it is
subsequently used to challenge his credibility. In such a case, as per
Kuldip, supra, the cross-examination should be permitted. If the
original evidence was not incriminating, the quid pro quo was never
engaged, and the witness cannot ask of the state that he be prevented
from being cross-examined as to his credibility should he assert
matters differently in a subsequent proceeding, even if the ultimate
effect of that subsequent cross-examination may be adverse to his
interest. This is consistent with the language of s. 13 which grants to
every witness the right not to have any “incriminating evidence so
given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings.
(italics added; underlining in the original)43

The majority easily found that there was a real danger that the jury
would use Noël’s prior incriminating testimony for incriminatory
purposes at his own trial. Justice Arbour was also confident that no jury
instruction, however skillful, could eliminate this danger.44
It is clear that the most important distinction made by Arbour J. in
Noël was the difference between an accused who had previously
testified voluntarily at his or her own previous trial, and an accused who
was previously compelled to be a witness at someone else’s trial.
However, there are a few portions of her judgment where this distinction
is blurred. In particular, Arbour J. said:
It then becomes apparent that in keeping with the quid pro quo which
lies at the heart of s. 13, the state should not be permitted to introduce
as part of its case an incriminating statement made by the accused in
another proceeding, even if that “other proceeding” was his previous
trial for the same offence (see Dubois, supra); nor should the state be
permitted to introduce, in cross-examination, for the purpose of

43
44

Id., at 33.
Id., at 36.
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“incriminating” the accused, an innocuous statement that the accused
made while a witness in another proceeding.45

In a lengthy dissent, L’Heureux-Dubé J. held that the crossexamination of Noël was proper and based on the correct interpretation
of Kuldip. She accused the majority of reversing important aspects of
Kuldip, including the holding that cross-examination on credibility is no
longer permitted under both section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act and
section 13 of the Charter.46 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé expressed great
faith in the ability of jurors to carry out the sometimes difficult and
subtle tasks they are asked to undertake. Indeed, she held that, in the
absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, the long-standing faith of the
courts in the abilities of jurors should be preserved. She held that
“evidence that the jury as an institution is fundamentally incapable of
properly using this evidence is needed before such a sweeping change
should be made.”47 Moreover, L’Heureux-Dubé J. suggested that Arbour
J.’s conception of the quid pro quo embodied in section 5 of the Canada
Evidence Act and section 13 of the Charter was a significant and
unwarranted distortion, asserting that: “With respect, no principled
system of justice, and indeed no criminal system concerned with
ascertaining the truth, would ever agree to enter into such an
arrangement.”48
Noël was applied by the Court in R. v. Allen.49 However, there was
no real discussion of section 13 in that case.
5. Conclusion: Confusion
Twenty years of experience with section 13 of the Charter has given rise
to inconsistency and dubious distinctions.50 It is no longer clear what
underlying principle anchors section 13. Since Mannion, the Court has
struggled with the distinction between use of prior testimony for
incrimination as opposed to credibility. Recognizing its problematic

45

Id., at para. 25. See also paras. 4, 54 and 59.
Id., at 63.
47
Id., at 48. In making this assertion, L’Heureux-Dubé J. relied very heavily on the
judgment of Dickson C.J. in R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670.
48
Id., at 61.
49
[2003] S.C.J. No. 16, 172 C.C.C. (3d) 449.
50
See Hamish Stewart & Erica Bussey, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Too
Strong, Too Weak or Both?” (2005) 9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 369.
46
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nature, the Noël Court sought to provide greater protection by creating
what turns out to be an unworkable standard. Moreover, because of
obiter dicta remarks in Noël, the fundamental question of whether
section 13 applies to a re-trial situation is left up in the air.51

III. R. V. HENRY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPULSION
In addition to confusion, some courts have bristled against the
implications of Noël, especially the prospect of an accused person
testifying in one way at his or her first trial, and then giving completely
contradictory evidence at a re-trial, with no consequences other than a
possible prosecution for perjury or for giving contradictory evidence.
This set the stage for the issue to return once again to the Supreme Court
of Canada in R. v. Henry.
Henry and Riley were charged with first degree murder. Both
testified at what turned out to be their first trials. Both relied upon the
defence of intoxication. They were convicted, but their convictions were
overturned on appeal. At the re-trial, both accused testified again, but
Henry claimed to have been so intoxicated that he had virtually no
memory of the events. Riley resiled from the defence of intoxication,
and pointed the finger at Henry as being responsible for the victim’s
death. The Crown was permitted to cross-examine both accused on their
prior testimony, leading to a conviction of both. Again, they appealed
their convictions, relying on R. v. Noël to support their position that
cross-examination was improper in the circumstances.
Their appeals were dismissed by a majority of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.52 Justices Southin and Newbury held that there were
various passages in the opinion of Arbour J. that suggested that the law
articulated in that case applied to the situation of an accused who
testified at a re-trial inconsistent with his or her evidence at the first
trial.53 Justice Southin said that, if the obiter in Noël were authoritative,
it would lead to the creation of a new constitutionally protected right:
“the right to swear falsely in one’s own defence or, to put it another
way, a right to give the jury one story at one’s first trial and if, from

51
See Hamish Stewart, “Henry in the Supreme Court of Canada: Re-orienting the s. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination” (2005) 34 C.R. (6th) 112.
52
[2003] B.C.J. No. 2068, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (C.A.).
53
Supra, note 4, at para. 25.
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some judicial misstep, one gets a new trial, to abandon the story which
the first jury had rejected and try something different on the second
jury.”54
Writing for the entire Court, Binnie J. engaged in a thorough review
of the Court’s section 13 jurisprudence, from Dubois to Noël. In artful
understatement, he concluded:
Clearly there has not been consistent adherence to the underlying
purpose of s. 13, namely “to protect individuals from being directly
compelled to incriminate themselves.”55

Along the way to reaching this conclusion, he observed that, in Dubois,
the Court asserted that the protection was not predicated on whether the
accused testified voluntarily or under compulsion in the prior
proceeding.56 The Mannion Court was silent on the matter. In Kuldip,
the Court implicitly recognized the importance of compulsion. In his
review of the Court’s previous decisions, Binnie J. was also keenly
aware of the artificiality of jurors and judges keeping separate the
incriminating and credibility-related value of prior testimony.57
Justice Binnie considered the Noël Court’s emphasis on the
presence of compulsion as a pre-condition to the operation of section 13
protection. As Binnie J. held:
It must be recognized that a witness who was also the accused at the
first trial is at both trials a voluntary rather than a compelled witness,
and therefore does not offer the same quid pro quo. (The notion that an
accused who volunteers testimony can simultaneously object to
answering questions whose answers may tend to incriminate him or
her is a difficult concept. The whole point of volunteering testimony is
to respond to the prosecution’s case. Even answer to his or her own
counsel’s questions may tend to incriminate).58

It is clear that the Henry Court was attracted to the compulsion/
voluntary dichotomy as a triggering mechanism for section 13.
However, there were two obstacles to making this the unifying concept
54

Supra, note 52, at 350-51. Justice Southin also said (at 351): “In that context, I use the
word ‘right’ to mean that which one can do with impunity or with so little consequence as makes no
matter. A possible charge under s. 136 of the Criminal Code is of trivial consequence to a man
charged with first degree murder.”
55
Supra, note 2, at 467 (emphasis in the original).
56
Id., at 463.
57
Id., at 465-66.
58
Id., at 465.
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of section 13 protection. First, the Court’s own cases tended to lean in
the opposite direction. Second, and as observed by Southin and
Newbury JJ.A. in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, obiter dicta in
the majority reasons in Noël cast doubt on the centrality of compulsion.
However, both obstacles were overcome.
1. Precedent
As for precedent, the focus on voluntariness seemed quite sensible given
the Court’s gravitation to the quid pro quo theory of section 13 of the
Charter. However, over the years, various members of the Court had
expressed the view that it did not matter. After Noël, it clearly did,
although Binnie J. wished to make this change without disturbing the
holding in Dubois that prohibited the Crown from using prior, noncompelled testimony as part of its case in chief.
The Court refused to reconsider Dubois, holding that, when a new
trial is ordered, an accused person has the choice not to testify at all. As
Binnie J. explained:
Thus, to allow the Crown simply to file the testimony of the accused
given at the prior trial (now overturned) would permit the Crown
indirectly to compel the accused to testify at the retrial where s. 11(c)
of the Charter would not permit such compelled self-incrimination
directly.
Dubois, to repeat, was an attempt to compel testimony. The result was
correct and we should decline the invitation to revisit it.59

Effectively reverting to the “case to meet” principle, Binnie J. found that
such a procedure would be tantamount to a section 11(c) violation.60
The Court took a different view of Mannion. Justice Binnie
observed that, in that case, there was no attempt to compel testimony as
there was in Dubois. Instead, the accused testified voluntarily at the
prior proceeding and decided to testify again on the re-trial. Justice
Binnie found the quid pro quo missing from the equation, thereby
undermining the purposes of the application of section 13 of the Charter.
Reflecting on the experience of the Court since Dubois and Mannion
were decided, Binnie J. observed that failing to keep the underlying
59

Id., at 467.
Given that the factual scenario in Dubois does not fit neatly into the wording of s. 13 of
the Charter, this type of violation is probably classified under s. 7.
60
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purpose of section 13 of the Charter clearly in sight has created
unworkable distinctions in the law. Accordingly, Binnie J. concluded
that:
In my respectful view, notwithstanding the strong Court that
decided Mannion and the cases that followed it, we should hold that s.
13 is not available to an accused who chooses to testify at his or her
retrial on the same indictment.61

The Court decided that there were compelling reasons to justify one of
its “rare” departures from its precedents. The prime reason offered for
departing from Mannion was that the Court in that case failed to adhere
to the underlying purposes of section 13 of the Charter articulated in
Dubois. Second, Binnie J. held that, over time, the distinction drawn
between impeachment of credibility and incrimination had proven
unworkable. Justice Binnie essentially held that Arbour J.’s attempts in
Noël to address this problem made matters worse.62
Justice Binnie concluded that maintaining earlier distinctions where
voluntariness was considered irrelevant led to unfairness to persons who
were compelled to testify in previous proceedings because they were
placed on the same footing as those who testified voluntarily. He
concluded:
Accused persons who testify at their first trial and then volunteer
inconsistent testimony at the retrial on the same charge are in no need
of protection “from being indirectly compelled to incriminate
themselves” in any relevant sense of the word, and s. 13 protection
should not be available to them.63

Of course, this sweeping passage was sufficient to do away with
Mannion and Kuldip, especially since Kuldip was an extension of the
Court’s holding in Mannion. Consequently, the Court also eradicated
the distinction between credibility and incrimination such that, “[i]f the
contradiction reasonably gives rise to an inference of guilt, s. 13 of the
Charter does not preclude the trier of fact from drawing the common
sense inference.”64
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Id., at 468. Of course, this broad statement is subject to the significant qualification
provided by upholding Dubois.
62
Id., at 469-70.
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Id., at 470-71.
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Id., at 471.
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While the Court’s decision in Noël was largely consumed with the
problem of improper use of prior testimony for incriminatory purposes,
a distinction eradicated after Henry, the Henry Court left Noël intact as
it applied to the factual scenario in that case. This was largely based on
the analysis of section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act. However,
Binnie J. went further and held that when testimony is truly compelled,
as it was in Noël, under section 13 as under section 5(2), it must be
treated as inadmissible for any purpose.65 In short, where an accused
testifies at his or her own prior trial, the previous testimony can be used
in cross-examination for any purpose at the re-trial. When the accused
testifies as a witness at someone else’s trial, the testimony may not be
used for any purpose. Everything now turns on the issue of
voluntariness.
2. Obiter Dicta
To reach this result, it was also necessary for the Court to address the
obiter comments of Arbour J. in Noël. As noted above, in parts of her
judgment, Arbour J. leaves the impression that the protection afforded to
someone in Mr. Noël’s circumstances also applies to a person who
testifies at his or her own first trial, and then again at a re-trial.
Justice Binnie engaged in an interesting analysis of distinguishing
between the binding ratio decidendi of a judgment and that properly
considered to be merely non-binding obiter. This task is complicated,
especially given the realities of the Court’s institutional role that,
according to section 40 of the Supreme Court Act,66 is focused more on
questions of public importance. The Court’s work is more concerned
with principle, rather than error correction.67 The demarcation line
between binding and non-binding aspects of Supreme Court judgments
is less tidy in the constitutional realm, where the Court attempts to
develop analytical frameworks that, while not strictly essential for the
disposition of a case, are intended to be binding on lower courts.68
However, Binnie J. indicated that the principle that emerged from R. v.
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Id., at 471-72.
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
67
See Bertha Wilson, “Decision-making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227.
68
Supra, note 2, at 473. As an example, Binnie J. refers to the s. 1 analysis in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321.
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Sellars,69 whereby lower courts are bound by considered rulings on
points of law not strictly necessary to the conclusion, ought now to be
“disavowed”.70
While the lower courts are now released from the strictures of
Sellars, it is still unclear as to what is binding and what is not. As Binnie
J. writes:
The weight decreases as one moves away from the dispositive ratio
decidendi to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for
guidance and which should be accepted as authoritative. Beyond that,
there will be commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to
be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not
“binding” in the sense that the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated
form would have it.71

This approach is designed to foster growth and creativity in the
development of the common law.72
Applied to Noël, Binnie J. refused to isolate Arbour J.’s comments
as problematic. Instead, and in more sweeping terms, he held that, to the
extent that statements in other cases are “inconsistent with the rationale
of compulsion” (the “quid pro quo”), they should no longer be regarded
as authoritative.73 Justice Binnie essentially agreed with the comments
of members of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Henry that parts
of the Court’s comments in Noël were plainly wrong.

IV. THE FUTURE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Court in Henry has reconfigured the law of self-incrimination in a
way that makes it more rational. Despite the fact that Henry has resulted
in the constriction of section 13 protection, initial reactions to the case
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have been positive.74 Still, the law has been developed into a very
complicated state,75 with a couple of questions left lingering.
1. Compulsion
The critical distinction in Binnie J’s reasons in Henry is the voluntary
vs. non-voluntary nature of the prior testimony. Yet, the Court does not
elaborate on the concept of voluntariness to any great degree. The
protection applies only when the accused testifies at a prior proceeding
as a witness at someone else’s trial, whether or not he or she testifies
pursuant to a subpoena. This approach is completely consistent with the
quid pro quo approach to self-incrimination. However, it engages
voluntariness in only the most formal sense. There may well be a
qualitative difference between the accused who is forced to testify for
the Crown at the trial of another, and the accused who decides (without
a subpoena) to testify for the defence at the trial of the same person.
Should the person in the latter situation be afforded the protection of
section 13? Moreover, this conception of testimonial voluntariness
simplifies the apparent “choice” of an accused person to testify at his or
her trial. Professors Paciocco and Stuesser distinguish between
“tactical” and legal compulsion.76 As the authors posit, “accused persons
may come to feel that they have no choice but to testify because of the
strength of the evidence against them.”77 Yet, Henry only recognizes
legal compulsion, despite how difficult the choice faced by an accused
person may be.78
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See Stewart, supra, note 51, at 112 and Stuart, supra, note 72.
It was necessary for Professor Stewart to include an Appendix (Effect of Henry on
Previous Decisions) to his article to properly explain the law.
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David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin,
2005), at 283-84.
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Id., at 283. Moreover, in the case of multiple accused trials, if one accused decides to
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to whether to testify.
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Paciocco & Stuesser, id., point to R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 148 C.C.C. (3d)
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2. Credibility and the Role of the Jury
Justice Binnie’s eradication of the Kuldip/Mannion distinction between
cross-examination for the purposes of incrimination and crossexamination going to credibility is welcome. It was a much-criticized
aspect of the Court’s section 13 jurisprudence.79 However, the
implications of this aspect of Henry may be more far-reaching. The
Court’s decision to allow multiple uses of prior testimony is rooted in its
adherence to the quid pro quo theory of self-incrimination. If there is no
compulsion, then there is no reason to subject subsequent use to
credibility alone. Of course, this raises the question of why the Court did
not also accept the invitation to reconsider its holding in Dubois. Dubois
does not fit nicely into the post-Henry world of section 13.80 Professor
Hamish Stewart argues that, given the focus on the compelled nature of
the prior testimony, “it is hard to understand how Dubois can remain
good law.”81 This is because it is not really a section 13 case. As Binnie
J. points out, filing the testimony from a previous trial as part of the
Crown’s case in-chief effectively permits compelled testimony, contrary
to section 11(c) of the Charter. It is not section 13 that prohibits this use
of prior testimony. It is a creative interpretation of section 11(c) that
achieves this result.
Beyond the theoretical reasons for eradicating the distinction
between different uses of prior testimony, there was another, very
practical reason that motivated the Court in Henry. One of the accepted
“truths” of Canadian criminal law is the ability of jurors to follow subtle
instructions as to permissible and impermissible uses of certain types of
evidence. The use of an accused person’s criminal record is probably the
most commonly cited example.82 Indeed, this example was relied upon
by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Noël to argue against the majority’s attempt to
tighten up the dubious distinction drawn by the majority in Kuldip. Is
79
See M. Naeem Rauf, “Section 13 of the Charter and the Use of an Accused’s Prior
Testimony: A Reply to David Doherty and Ronald Delisle” (1991) 4 C.R. (4th) 42. At 47 and 48,
Mr. Rauf suggested that the distinction is “artificial in the extreme” and “unrealistic”. He further
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the Court’s new stance in Henry to be taken as recognition that we
cannot rely on the ability of jurors to make these subtle distinctions?
What of our dependence on jurors’ abilities to disabuse their minds of
pre-trial publicity or the efficacy of all sorts of other limiting
instructions, such as those related to similar fact evidence, bad character
evidence and statements of co-accused? Our faith in the institution of
trial by jury has long necessitated that we cling to beliefs in these
special powers of jurors. But social scientists have long been telling us
that our faith is misplaced.83 Is the Court in Henry starting to question its
own faith on this issue? Given that the eradication of the distinction
between the two uses of evidence was primarily driven by theoretical
concerns, it is probably best to be cautious in gauging the implications
of this aspect of the Court’s decision.

V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s unanimous judgment in Henry is important for many reasons.
First and foremost, for its re-orientation of the law of self-incrimination in
section 13 of the Charter. Despite the questions that still linger after
Henry, we are left with a more sensible account of a difficult provision of
the Charter. As Southin J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
recognized in Henry, we work in an era in which appellate courts order
re-trials with great regularity.84 For the criminal justice system to maintain
credibility in striking the fine balance between rights protection in pursuit
of its truth-seeking goal, the decision in Noël could not stand. The
sensible approach in Henry tends to achieve this balance a bit better, such
that an accused person cannot now tell one story at his or her first trial,
and then another at the re-trial, all with complete impunity.
Henry also sheds light on the self-reflective qualities of the Supreme
Court of Canada. It would have been easy for the Court to have declined
the invitation to re-calibrate the law of self-incrimination, given that Noël
had not been long decided. While striking a defensive chord at times, and
apparently being unable to come out and plainly say “we were wrong,”
Henry is a heartening example of a dynamic Court, responsive to
legitimate concerns expressed about its previous decisions.
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